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SUMMARY
Corporate sustainability has gone mainstream, and many companies have taken 
meaningful steps to improve their own environmental performance. But while 
corporate political actions such as lobbying can have a greater impact on environmental 
quality, they are ignored in most current sustainability metrics. It is time for these 
metrics to be expanded to critically assess firms based on the sustainability impacts 
of their public policy positions. To enable such assessments, firms must become as 
transparent about their corporate political responsibility (CPR) as their corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). For their part, rating systems must demand such information 
from firms and include evaluations of corporate political activity in their assessments 
of corporate environmental responsibility.
KeYwoRdS: sustainability, lobbying, corporate social responsibility, business & 
society, business-government relations, policy making, non-market strategy
C orporate sustainability—once viewed as utopian, irrelevant, or even subversive—has gone mainstream. Of the Fortune 500 global companies, four-fifths now issue sustainability reports, describing a wide variety of environment-friendly activities.1 Most 
leading business schools have courses in corporate sustainability, if not full-
fledged dual-degree programs aiming to create a sustainable world “through the 
power of business.” Support for corporate sustainability comes from both ends 
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of the political spectrum. Think tanks such as the Property and Environment 
Research Center advocate “free-market environmentalism,” frustrated that gov-
ernment intervention to protect the environment has gone too far. At the same 
time, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Rainforest Action 
Network have embraced “private politics,” engaging directly with corporations 
to produce change because they are frustrated that government intervention 
has not gone far enough. Both perspectives reflect a belief that market forces 
can help lead the business world toward a more virtuous relationship with the 
social and natural world.
This expansion of business concern for its social and natural environment 
represents real progress, and is to be applauded. Global challenges such as ocean 
acidification, global terrorism, fisheries depletion, poverty, deforestation, toxic 
chemical emissions, and climate change are considered “wicked” problems 
because of their complexity and intractability, and help from all quarters is needed. 
Business leaders who take a long view want to ensure that the resources on which 
they depend will be healthy and robust in the future. But in a world of global 
economic competition, it is essential to have “rules of the game” that create a level 
playing field, including financial incentives for firms to internalize the costs of 
their actions on the natural environment and the societies of which they are a 
part. Indeed, recent research suggests that the most important drivers of corporate 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance are actually country-
level political institutions.2
How are the right “rules of the game” to be put in place? Traditionally this 
has been the responsibility of the state, not of the private sector. Yet these rules 
will emerge more readily with support from influential segments of the business 
community. Of course, the interests of business are diverse and no one expects 
firms to take public policy positions that damage the interests of their sharehold-
ers. It is natural that some firms will support policies that enhance sustainability, 
and others will oppose them. But with the rules of the game so important, it is 
also natural that companies are beginning to be evaluated by stakeholders based 
on the political positions they take.
In this article, we argue that the time has come for corporate political 
action to be taken into account by activists, scholars, consumers, and inves-
tors who care about sustainability. Those who assess firms on their social and 
environmental performance should add another critical dimension to their 
assessment of civic virtue and responsibility, namely, the extent to which 
firms support (or oppose) public policies that contribute to sustainability. To 
make this possible, firms must become as transparent about their political 
activity as many have become about their sustainability activity. Although 
this is clearly a nascent issue in corporate responsibility, there are signs that 
leading parts of civil society are already beginning to advocate for greater 
transparency around corporate political action. Managing this emerging set of 
stakeholder pressures will pose fascinating new challenges for corporate strat-
egy beyond markets.
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The Promise and the Limits of the “Market for Virtue”
A decade ago, in an influential book, David Vogel assessed the potential 
for business leadership—driven by the “market for virtue” rather than by legal 
requirements—to fill the “governance gap” left by an increasingly gridlocked 
state.3 He found numerous success stories for this sort of “civil regulation” as 
distinct from “government regulation,” ranging from working conditions in 
developing countries to the natural environment to human rights and global cor-
porate citizenship. Nike has adopted labor and environmental standards for the 
over 700 factories abroad that make its products, has created a credible monitor-
ing process, and has canceled contracts with suppliers who perform poorly; sup-
plier codes-of-conduct and supplier auditing are now common practice among 
leading brands. Home Depot, Lowe’s, and other retailers have adopted voluntary 
codes of conduct that have helped to preserve old-growth forests and improve 
forestry practices in North America and beyond. Thousands of companies around 
the world have signed onto the United Nations (UN) Global Compact (which bills 
itself as the world’s largest corporate sustainability initiative) and have agreed to 
its principles for the improvement of human rights, the treatment of labor and 
the environment, and the reduction of corruption.
Moreover, a body of data is emerging that demonstrates quantitatively the 
impact of some corporate sustainability initiatives. Energy-efficient commercial 
buildings that are Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) or 
Energy Star certified have an occupancy rate 11% higher than other buildings 
and sell for 16% to 17% more.4 These initiatives have the ancillary benefit of 
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In addition, products that are per-
ceived to offer health benefits have found a growing niche in the marketplace: 
organic food accounts for over 5% of total food sales in the United States, and it 
grew 8% in 2016 to top $40 billion for the first time.5 Furthermore, over 20% of 
all wild-caught fish6 and 15% of wood harvested from temperate forests around 
the world7 comes from fisheries and forests certified as sustainable.
For all its success, however, the market for virtue is often “narrow and 
limited” in its ability to solve social and environmental problems.8 Voluntary codes 
of conduct in the apparel sector did not prevent the 2013 collapse of the Rana 
Plaza textile factory in Bangladesh that killed 1,134 workers.9 New certifications 
for sustainable forestry have emerged that offer weaker standards for firms that do 
not want to meet the most stringent demands.10 The UN Global Compact has been 
widely criticized, and even derided as a form of “bluewash” by Ralph Nader.11 BP, 
once lauded as a leader in the fight against climate change, has had its reputation 
ruined by the massive Deepwater Horizon explosion that killed 11 workers and 
created the largest oil spill in U.S. history.12 Globally, 90% of fisheries are fully or 
overfished,13 the agricultural production system is under stress from a burgeoning 
world population,14 and water supplies are threatened around the world.15 There 
is mounting evidence that climate change poses severe threats to global well-
being, and by some estimates we have until just 2020 to bend the “climate curve” 
and rein in climate change before damaging warming becomes inevitable.16 The 
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2015 State of Green Business report—authored by the normally upbeat Joel 
Makower, executive editor of GreenBiz.com—struck a somber note. “Companies 
continued to tinker with incremental changes in their products and operations to 
reduce their carbon emissions, energy use, waste, chemicals of concern and other 
aspects of their ‘environmental footprint.’” But despite these efforts, he contin-
ued, “All told, they were necessary but wholly insufficient to address their fair 
share of environmental impacts.”17
All of this reinforces Vogel’s argument. Civil regulation can partially fill the 
governance gap but cannot fully replace public policy. The “carrot” of market 
incentives can reward sustainability leaders, but it cannot force all of the laggards 
to follow suit. For that, the “stick” of penalties for poor performance is required, 
and that remains largely the domain of government.18 Vogel concluded,
If companies are serious about acting more responsibly, then they need to reexam-
ine their relationship to government as well as improve their own practices. And 
those who want corporations to be more virtuous should expect firms to act more 
responsibly on both dimensions. Civil and government regulation both have a 
legitimate role to play in improving public welfare. The former reflects the poten-
tial of the market for virtue; the latter recognizes its limits.19
Corporate Political Responsibility (CPR)
Although Vogel did not use the term, he was effectively calling for CPR—
which we define as a firm’s disclosure of its political activities and advocacy of 
socially and environmentally beneficial public policies—not just corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). In fact, one can argue that
Compared with companies’ efforts to green their operations, corporate political 
actions such as lobbying or campaign funding can have more influence on envi-
ronmental protection, and arguably represent the greatest impact a company can 
have on protecting—or harming—the environment.20
From this perspective, CPR may be the most important element of a com-
pany’s sustainability strategy.
CPR is not entirely unheard of. Consider the domain of climate change 
mitigation.21 In 1997, then-CEO John Browne of BP became the first oil industry 
executive to acknowledge the role of human activity in creating climate change. 
In 1999, Ford Motor Company pulled out of the Global Climate Coalition, an 
industry lobbying group that rejected climate science and opposed climate legisla-
tion.22 In 2007, the U.S. Climate Action Partnership—a coalition of environmen-
tal activists and business corporations—was established to lobby for a mandatory 
cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions in the United States. Its “Call for 
Action” created the blueprint for the Waxman-Markey bill that successfully passed 
the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009. In 2011, a group of European firms 
including Aviva and Danone likewise issued a public call for the European Union 
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to adopt deeper GHG emissions cuts.23 The Prince of Wales Corporate Leaders 
Group brings together a group of large multinational firms including Unilever, 
Tesco, and Acciona to press for stronger public action on climate change.24 When 
President Trump announced his plan to withdraw from the Paris Climate 
Agreement, Jeff Immelt, then-CEO of General Electric, tweeted: “Climate change 
is real. Industry must now lead and not depend on the government.”25 The We Are 
Still In movement, a coalition of U.S. business, education, and local government 
leaders committed to upholding the U.S. commitments to the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change, provides a vivid example of what CPR looks like. Hundreds of 
companies have come together with local governments, universities, and non-
profit groups to offer their vocal support for national and international commit-
ments to mitigate climate change.26
Examples of CPR also come from the social world, as when Emmanuel 
Faber, CEO of Danone, pushed for a reform of French civil law to revise the arti-
cles defining the company and to open a new status for public benefit corpora-
tions in France.27 Another example came when Apple CEO Tim Cook spoke out 
publicly opposing a pending religious freedom law that critics warned would 
allow discrimination against same-sex couples.28 After President Trump was 
unable to articulate a consistent criticism of the neo-Nazis whose march through 
Charlottesville, Virginia, resulted in the death of an innocent young woman, 
numerous CEOs resigned from the President’s Manufacturing Council, including 
Merck CEO Ken Frazier, Under Armour CEO Kevin Plank, and Intel CEO Brian 
Krzanich.29 Bill George, former CEO of Medtronic, argues that it is increasingly 
important for CEOs to speak out on key public issues. George recognizes that 
CEOs face difficult tradeoffs when deciding to speak out, but he argues that “busi-
ness leaders should base their stands on the company’s mission and its values. If 
these are violated, then they have an obligation to speak publicly.”30
Unfortunately, there is evidence that some companies use their corporate 
sustainability initiatives as cover for their political efforts to block meaningful 
change. Writing in Harvard Business Review, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode 
Island laments that
Despite the statements emitted from oil companies’ executive suites about taking 
climate change seriously and supporting a price on carbon, their lobbying presence 
in Congress is 100% opposed to any action. In particular, the American Petroleum 
Institute, the oil industry trade association, is an implacable foe. Given the industry’s 
massive conflict of interest, there is every reason to believe they are playing a double 
game: trying to buy a little credibility with these public comments while using all 
their quiet lobbying muscle to crush any threat of bipartisan action on the carbon 
pricing they claim to espouse.31
Similar concerns arose when CEOs of large firms like Dow Chemical and 
Corning Inc. signed an open letter to the Wall Street Journal urging the United 
States to remain in the Paris Agreement, while simultaneously supporting the 
Industrial Energy Consumers of America (IECA), a lobbying group that was 
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pushing the Administration to withdraw from the Agreement.32 These examples 
show how some firms take symbolic action that sounds good in an annual report 
or in the newspaper while hiding the fact that they are blocking substantive prog-
ress on the political front. This sort of two-faced strategy makes a mockery of 
“corporate social responsibility” and turns it into a public relations gimmick. It 
illustrates the dark side of business participation in politics, and it raises the ques-
tion of whether business should be involved in politics at all.
The Case against CPR
In fact, there is a long tradition of arguing against business engagement in 
politics. Milton Friedman famously argued in 1970 that “there is one and only 
one social responsibility of business―to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits, so long as it stays within the rules of the game.”33 
Business leaders had no special expertise in social welfare, Friedman argued, and 
should leave it to the realm of politicians. Aneel Karnani presented an updated 
version of this argument in California Management Review in 2010.34 However, 
both Friedman and Karnani naively ignore the role business leaders play in cre-
ating those very rules of the game. Business does not simply keep its nose out of 
politics—it is actively involved, to the tune of roughly $2.6 billion a year in lob-
bying expenditures.35 Indeed, Friedman’s close colleague George Stigler argued 
that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and oper-
ated primarily for its benefit.”36 Coming from the opposite end of the ideological 
spectrum, Robert Reich made a related point in 1998 in California Management 
Review. Echoing Friedman, Reich argued that in a system where business firms 
view their primary responsibility as a fiduciary one toward investors, they have a 
secondary responsibility to the rest of society to “respect the political process by 
staying out of it.”37
Unfortunately, although this nostrum is appealing, it is also unrealistic at 
present. Recent Supreme Court decisions clearly affirm that corporations have the 
right to participate in politics, and further establish that there are no absolute lim-
its on how much companies can spend for political purposes, and no require-
ments to disclose the spending if they structure it in particular ways.38 In Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the Supreme Court held 
5-4 that it is unconstitutional to restrict “independent” political expenditures by 
business, nonprofit organizations, labor unions, and other associations. Nor do 
donors even need to disclose their contributions, if they give to a 501(c)(4) “social 
welfare” organization that engages in “issue advocacy” rather than “express advo-
cacy” for a particular candidate. What this means in practice is that the organiza-
tion must not use the “eight magic words” that appeared in a footnote in Buckley 
v. Valeo (1976): “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” “cast your ballot for,” “Smith for 
Congress,” “vote against,” “defeat,” “reject,” or any variations thereof. An ad say-
ing, “Crime is bad. Smith is soft on crime. Jones is tough on crime.” would not 
count as “express advocacy” even though it strongly implies that one should sup-
port Jones. The bottom line is that corporations can now legally and covertly give 
unlimited amounts of “dark money” to fund issue ads to influence elections.
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It is understandable that companies prefer to keep their political activities 
secret, and that they are wary of backlash when their involvement in the public 
arena is exposed. New research shows that firms that have faced a social move-
ment boycott shift their political action away from campaign contributions and 
toward more covert forms such as lobbying or CEO donations.39 The backlash can 
come from both ends of the political spectrum. From the right, the Wall Street 
Journal has attacked firms that support cap-and-trade policy as “Kyoto capitalists” 
that seek to profit from a “cynical approach to regulation” whose costs are “foisted 
on the backs of others.”40 Even efficient policies will be derided by those who 
believe “the free market” is always best left alone. From the left, activists often 
level charges of greenwashing at firms that highlight their environmental good 
deeds while downplaying their less savory activities. Firms that are small, pure-
play environmental startups have a good chance of escaping such criticism, but 
this is much more difficult for large incumbent firms with diversified portfolios. 
Fears of backlash may be overstated, however: when a list of 91 companies con-
tributing to a 501(c)(4) dark money group were exposed by the New York Times in 
2014, their share prices actually rose.41
The Need for Transparency
Even if it is unrealistic to exclude business from politics that does not mean 
that unlimited covert business spending in politics is a good thing. In fact, there 
are reasons to believe quite the opposite is true. Secrecy breeds a host of prob-
lems. One is the corporate hypocrisy described by Senator Whitehouse, whereby 
firms are able to curry favor with the public through CSR activities while block-
ing laws that would require them to stop imposing environmental costs on their 
neighbors.42 Another is the corruption that can set in when wealthy individuals 
or organizations are able to buy political favors. A third is the policy bias that 
emerges when the true sources of lobbying are hidden. One example is “astro-
turf lobbying,” in which companies covertly fund artificial grassroots action to 
block the passage of laws that would increase their costs.43 (Unfortunately, the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 was stripped of any mention of such tactics, 
allowing them to persist.44) Another example, ushered in by Citizens United, is the 
use of tax-exempt “social welfare” advocacy groups to make unlimited political 
expenditures without revealing the identities of the funders.45
The importance of transparency is hard to overstate: it is the crucial safe-
guard to protect society from capture by private interests. Moreover, without 
transparency, shareholders themselves are cheated because they are kept in the 
dark about how the funds they put at risk are being used. It is encouraging that 
firms are becoming more transparent about their environmental impacts. Indeed, 
a large and growing number of firms are reporting in a manner consistent with 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, currently considered the gold standard for 
environmental disclosure), with participation growing from 12 firms in 1999 to 
over 5,000 today. A few organizations, like Puma, have even begun issuing envi-
ronmental profit and loss statements that estimate environmental impacts in 
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dollars and cents. Although the practice of monetizing environmental impacts 
remains imperfect, it does help to simplify and focus sustainability reporting, and 
consulting organizations like Trucost are constantly refining the analytical meth-
ods for doing so.
Unfortunately, it is rare to find firms that are equally transparent about 
their political activity. Sustainability LLC, in conjunction with the World Wildlife 
Fund, conducted a study of 100 of the world’s largest corporations and rated their 
disclosure of political activities. Nearly half the firms provided no information at 
all about their political involvement. Of those that did disclose, none achieved the 
highest rating and only a handful (BASF, BP, Chevron, Dow, Ford, General Motors, 
GlaxoSmithKline, and HP) achieved even the second-highest level.46
Climate change provides an interesting example of the limitations of cur-
rent disclosure requirements. Recent research has found that there are two types 
of firms that tend to lobby politicians on the issue: those with high levels of green-
house gas (GHG) emissions per dollar of output and those with low levels of emis-
sions per dollar.47 Current disclosure rules do not require firms to be transparent 
about what types of policies they support, merely how much money they spent 
lobbying on a particular issue. But an educated guess would be that high-emission 
firms are lobbying for weaker regulations than low-emissions firms would prefer. 
After all, it has been shown that states were more likely to adopt a renewable 
portfolio standard if they had a staffed office of the American Solar Energy Society 
in their state.48 Investors, consumers, and activists who view climate change as an 
important issue increasingly want to know in greater detail just what policies 
firms have been advocating when they visit their Representatives and Senators, or 
the White House.
The demand for political transparency will likely become stronger as the 
Millennial generation grows in influence, because these “digital natives” have 
grown up with an expectation of radical transparency from the products they buy 
and the companies for which they work.49 Furthermore, although disclosure 
regarding money in political campaigns is crucial, CPR must also include various 
other possible activities that are adapted to the variety of political systems and 
regimes across the globe. One of the most important of these is avoiding corrup-
tion, which remains a powerful force in many parts of the world. The UN Global 
Compact has made fighting corruption one of its key action items, and it may 
serve as a vehicle for broader calls for political transparency. In order to see where 
the future of political disclosure lies, however, it is important to understand the 
current state of ESG ratings.
CPR and Social Responsibility Metrics
To what extent do existing social responsibility metrics capture corpo-
rate political action? For decades, socially responsible investing (SRI) has used 
a variety of “screens” to help investors channel their financial support away 
from activities they deem socially undesirable, such as tobacco or apartheid. 
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Ratings organizations such as KLD Research, Innovest, RiskMetrics, Asset4, 
Sustainalytics, and Vigeo Eiris have sprung up to offer screening services to 
investors that include a variety of ways to evaluate firms’ ESG performance.50 
In broad outlines, these services help investors to fund businesses they believe 
are making the world a better place, and to reduce funding for businesses under-
mining our social and environmental future. More narrowly focused organiza-
tions like CDP (formerly Carbon Disclosure Project) have also emerged to press 
publicly traded firms emitting GHGs to disclose detailed information about their 
exposure to the physical and economic risks related to their carbon emissions; 
CDP has recently added questions related to corporate activity that could directly 
or indirectly influence public policy on climate change.51
Given the important role of public policy in pointing the way toward a 
sustainable future, it is rather surprising that most SRI advisors do not currently 
recognize the role of business in the public policy process. Consider what is cur-
rently being measured in corporate ESG metrics. One of the oldest and best known 
ESG rating systems originated from KLD Research, which was acquired by 
RiskMetrics in 2009, itself then acquired by MSCI in 2010. The stated purpose of 
the MSCI ESG ratings is to “to help investors to understand ESG risks and oppor-
tunities and integrate these factors into their portfolio construction and manage-
ment process.”52 Its key issues for each of the three categories are presented in 
Table 1. Reading through the issues and their explanations (which are not repro-
duced here for reasons of brevity), it is clear they focus on how the company 
manages its own direct impacts. None of the existing measures explicitly men-
tions corporate political action. One of the Governance issues is “Business Ethics,” 
and because corporate political action to block climate change legislation or toxic 
chemical reform could be seen as unethical, it could theoretically be partially sub-
sumed under the existing categories, but this is a very indirect path at best, and it 
is does not appear this is currently done under the MSCI rating system.53
The Asset4 criteria also pay scant attention to political action. The ratings 
system’s broad environmental criteria are resource use, emissions, and innova-
tion; its broad social criteria are workforce, human rights, community, and prod-
uct responsibility; and its governance criteria are management, shareholders, and 
CSR strategy. All focus on direct corporate operations, not on corporate political 
action. However, in addition Asset4 does track “Controversies,” which includes 
“business ethics controversies” such as “political contributions or bribery and cor-
ruption.” It includes two specific measures “Community Reputation Policy 
Elements/Political contribution” and “Lobbying Political Contributions.”54
Likewise, Sustainalytics does not devote much attention to political action, 
though it does include “Policy on Political Involvement and Contributions” and 
“Total Value of Political Contributions.”55 These measures are quite blunt and 
make no attempt to capture the firm’s positions on the issues on which it lobbies, 
opting instead for a simple aggregate dollar value of contributions. Moreover, 
even this fails to capture spending on issue advertising and other activities that are 
allowed in the United States under the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision.
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Table 1. MSCI Environmental, Social, and Governance Indicators.
Pillars Themes Key Issues
Environment Climate change Carbon emissions
 Product carbon footprint
 Financing environmental impact
 Climate change vulnerability
 Natural resources Water stress
 Biodiversity and land use
 Raw material sourcing
 Pollution and waste Toxic emissions and waste
 Packaging material and waste
 Electronic waste
 Environmental opportunities Opportunities in clean tech
 Opportunities in green building
 Opportunities in renewable energy
Social Human capital Labor management
 Health and safety
 Human capital development
 Supply chain labor standards
 Product liability Product safety and quality
 Chemical safety
 Financial product safety
 Privacy and data security
 Responsible investment
 Health and demographic risk
 Stakeholder opposition Controversial sourcing
 Social opportunities Access to communications
 Access to finance
 Access to health care
 Opportunities in nutrition and health
Governance Corporate governance Board
 Pay
 Ownership
 Accounting
 Corporate behavior Business ethics
 Anti-competitive practices
 Tax transparency
 Corruption and instability
 Financial system instability
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In short, the metrics used to evaluate CSR and corporate sustainability 
today by most ratings systems almost completely ignore the role of business in 
shaping public policy.
Emerging Signs of Change
The situation is beginning to change, however. The GRI Sustainability 
Reporting Standards, created in 1997, “are the first and most widely adopted 
global standards for sustainability reporting.”56 One of the newest additions to 
the GRI reporting framework is standard 415, which addresses the topic of public 
policy:
The purpose of this disclosure is to identify an organization’s support for political 
causes. This disclosure can provide an indication of the extent to which an orga-
nization’s political contributions are in line with its stated policies, goals, or other 
public positions. Direct or indirect contributions to political causes can also pres-
ent corruption risks, because they can be used to exert undue influence on the 
political process. Many countries have legislation that limits the amount an orga-
nization can spend on political parties and candidates for campaigning purposes. If 
an organization channels contributions indirectly through intermediaries, such as 
lobbyists or organizations linked to political causes, it can improperly circumvent 
such legislation.57
Standard 415 has an effective date of July 1, 2018, although “Earlier adop-
tion is encouraged.” Reporting “includes an organization’s participation in the 
development of public policy, through activities such as lobbying and making 
financial or in-kind contributions to political parties, politicians, or causes.” More 
specifically, GRI recommends,
The reporting organization should report: (1) the significant issues that are the 
focus of its participation in public policy development and lobbying; (2) its stance 
on these issues, and any differences between its lobbying positions and any stated 
policies, goals, or other public positions.58
Note that these requirements go well beyond simply reporting aggregate 
expenditures on lobbying, and would expose firms engaging in the hypocritical 
mix of pro-environmental public rhetoric and anti-environmental political action 
condemned by Senator Whitehouse.
In a related step, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) has issued guidelines for Transparency and Integrity in 
Lobbying. These also go beyond simply reporting aggregate amounts of money 
spent on particular issues, and note that disclosure should
elicit information on in-house and consultant lobbyists, capture the objective of 
lobbying activity, identify its beneficiaries, in particular the ordering party, and 
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point to those public offices that are its targets. Any supplementary disclosure 
requirements should take into consideration the legitimate information needs 
of key players in the public decision-making process. Supplementary disclosure 
requirements might shed light on where lobbying pressures and funding come 
from. Voluntary disclosure may involve social responsibility considerations about 
a business entity’s participation in public policy development and lobbying. To 
adequately serve the public interest, disclosure on lobbying activities and lobbyists 
should be stored in a publicly available register and should be updated in a timely 
manner in order to provide accurate information that allows effective analysis by 
public officials, citizens and businesses.59
Another interesting new development is the CPA/Zicklin Index of Corporate 
Political Disclosure and Accountability, produced by the nonprofit Center for 
Political Accountability and the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at 
Wharton. It rates the entire S&P 500 on the transparency of their political spend-
ing, and it finds substantial improvement over time.60 It does not, however, cover 
the critical area of lobbying expenditures. Another encouraging development is a 
joint effort by Transparency France and nine partner companies to craft a guide to 
reporting lobbying expenditures.61 This will help create norms of good practice in 
transparency around lobbying. But CPR goes far beyond lobbying. There are at 
least nine distinct channels through which firms exercise political influence, 
including lobbying, but also supporting think tanks, creating front groups, fund-
ing Political Action Committees (PACs) and super PACs, financing foundations, 
working through trade associations, participating in peak organizations, serving 
on advisory committees to government, and placing executives in administration 
roles.62 All of these must become a part of how we understand and evaluate CPR.
A more narrowly focused effort comes from a large group of institutional 
investors—including HSBC Global Asset Management, Trillium Asset Management, 
the University of California system, and the Harvard Management Company—
concerned about climate lobbying in particular. In collaboration with Principles 
for Responsible Investment (PRI), these investors announced that
Our expectation is that, when companies engage with public policy makers, they 
will support cost-effective policy measures to mitigate climate change risks and 
support an orderly transition to a low carbon economy. While an increasing num-
ber of companies have robust climate change policies and position statements and 
play a constructive role in policy discussions, we are concerned that many are also 
members or supporters of trade associations, think tanks and other third party 
organisations who lobby against policies to mitigate climate risks in a way that is 
inconsistent with our goal of maximising long-term portfolio value.63
The investors call for companies to support cost-effective policies to combat 
climate change, and to provide robust and detailed reporting on their direct and 
indirect lobbying on climate, including that done through trade associations or 
other membership groups.
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Arguably, the most advanced ratings system for corporate political action is 
that conducted by Vigeo Eiris, the leading source of CSR metrics in the European 
market.64 Starting in July, 2010, Vigeo, in partnership with Transparency France, 
announced that it would include “the transparency and integrity of influence 
strategies and practices” in its system for rating companies’ social responsibility.65 
In particular, its rating framework builds on the OECD guidelines—and includes 
both in-house lobbying and working with external specialists such as think tanks, 
lobbyists, and trade associations—to influence legislative and regulatory pro-
cesses. In 2013, Vigeo issued its first report on disclosure of corporate lobbying 
practices. It characterized the overall level of disclosure as “predictably weak,” but 
noted that North American companies appear to be somewhat ahead of European 
companies, and that the electric and gas industry and the chemical sector are the 
most advanced in their reporting on political activity.66
Vigeo Eiris rates corporate lobbying practices on three levels. At the leader-
ship level, it looks for the visibility of the company’s commitment to ensure trans-
parency and integrity of lobbying practices, its exhaustiveness, and the extent to 
which the company is clear about where oversight responsibility lies, and it 
involves the board in assuring compliance. At the implementation level, it looks for 
employee training programs, “publication of detailed information on lobbying 
activities (the list of fields of interest, information on the company’s networks and 
on the budget allocated to lobbying activities),” and “disclosure of the positions 
communicated to public authorities.” Finally, at the results level, it examines the 
quality of disclosure of direct and indirect lobbying expenditures, public scandals 
in which the company might be involved, and stakeholder criticisms of the firm’s 
lobbying practices.67
The actions of the OECD and the GRI, the creation of the CPA/Zicklin Index 
of Corporate Political Disclosure and Accountability, the PRI investor expectations 
on climate lobbying, and the expansion of the Vigeo Eiris ESG system to include 
lobbying activities all suggest we are at the cusp of a new wave of demands for 
political accountability. This should not be terribly surprising. Supreme Court deci-
sions like Citizens United vs. FEC have made it easier for companies to hide their 
political activities and have provoked widespread outrage. Indeed, 45% of the U.S. 
population lives in a state or locality that has supported amending the Constitution 
to overturn Citizens United.68 As has happened so often throughout history, a social 
movement is emerging to make demands that go beyond what is currently required 
by law. Political transparency and accountability will help to offset the widespread 
perception that government has been captured by the business sector, and they 
will empower investors, consumers, employees, and everyday citizens who wish to 
promote a transition to a sustainable and equitable economy.
Implications for Practice
For NGOs and activist investors, the implications of CPR are straightfor-
ward: because corporate political activity has as much (if not more) impact on 
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sustainability as CSR, it should be monitored and evaluated just as carefully and 
as extensively as we assess CSR. This also means that civil society actors who 
want to encourage virtuous corporate behavior should demand as much disclo-
sure for corporate political activity as they do for CSR and should judge firms 
accordingly. This does not mean that all civil society actors will agree on what 
constitutes politically responsible behavior, any more than they agree on what 
constitutes socially responsible behavior. For example, some would argue that 
labor standards that restrict children from assisting their mothers in making 
textiles are counter-productive, while others might disagree. Similarly, reason-
able people might disagree as to whether public policies that favor rooftop solar 
installations are in the public interest, since they may increase the challenges of 
managing the electric grid. The point is not to encourage a uniformity of think-
ing about whether particular environmental policies are or are not in the public 
interest. Rather, it is to encourage civil society actors to take corporate political 
action just as seriously as CSR, to monitor it, and to debate what “counts” as CPR 
and what does not.
For business managers the implications are more nuanced. It is unrealistic 
to expect firms to support public policies that financially disadvantage them in 
any significant way. We would not expect a coal company to support policies that 
would stop coal mining or an oil company to support policies that would stop 
drilling for oil.
What then might we realistically expect? We would make three 
suggestions.
 • First, fully disclose your corporate political activity. This may seem utopian in view 
of Citizens United and other Supreme Court decisions that currently allow 
unlimited covert political spending. Yet in the longer run, we do not expect 
current conditions to last. Social expectations change over time, and in the 
information age transparency is being increasingly insisted upon. Dark money 
and lobbying are unpopular with the public and with civil society actors, and 
the pressure for political disclosure is unlikely to abate. As with many other 
areas of corporate social performance, some firms will choose to enhance 
their legitimacy with the public by taking an early leadership position, while 
others will wait to see exactly how much will be expected of them. Firms that 
already have taken leadership positions on sustainability are likely to be the 
first movers in this new domain as well.
 • Second, align your political activity with your public pronouncements and CSR efforts. 
For example, if a firm is seeking to voluntarily reduce its carbon footprint, 
then we would expect it also to support public policies that require all firms 
to reduce their GHG emissions. To do otherwise is to expose the firm to the 
risk of being attacked for hypocrisy. For example, Target Corporation, long 
known for progressive stands and support of gay rights, came under attack 
for its donations to MN Forward, a political group that supported a guberna-
torial candidate who opposed same-sex marriage.69 Of course, these elements 
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of corporate non-market strategy should also be aligned with a firm’s market 
strategy to achieve maximum competitive advantage.70
 • Third, support public policies that will enable the private sector to better pursue sustain-
ability efforts and commitments. This does not mean supporting public policies 
that are financially disadvantageous to the firm, but on the contrary support-
ing policies that enable the firm to act more responsibly without suffering a 
competitive disadvantage. For example, it would not be reasonable to expect 
an oil company to support restrictions on fracking, but it might be reason-
able to ask it to support regulations restricting GHG emissions from fracking, 
since that would be environmentally beneficial and the additional operating 
costs marginal. Put another way, we expect firms (especially those that wish 
to be seen as leaders) to support public policies that are in their enlightened, 
long-run self-interest—just as we have come to do in the CSR realm, where it 
is now widely expected that firms will treat workers in developing countries 
decently in order to avoid public backlash. In other words, we expect compa-
nies to recognize the business case for government regulation, just as many 
have recognized the business case for CSR.
For business scholars, CPR offers a wealth of new research opportunities. 
An enormous literature exists on the connection between CSR and profitability,71 
and more recently a literature has emerged on whether or, more accurately, when 
it “pays to be green.”72 Less attention has been devoted to understanding when it 
pays to support green public policies. Some research suggests that the payoffs to 
political action are so high as to raise the question of why there is “so little” money 
in politics.73 Yet other work suggests that much corporate political spending—
unless it is in regulated industries—may be simply indulging the whims of corpo-
rate managers without providing much benefit for shareholders.74 More research 
is needed to home in on where and when it pays to advocate for more sustainable 
policies.
Conclusion
The concepts of CSR and corporate sustainability have become household 
words in recent decades, but they have their limits and are sometimes derided 
as mere window-dressing.75 To become more meaningful, they need to be re-
invented and expanded to include a more holistic understanding of the firm’s full 
impact on the social and natural world. Particularly important is a more respon-
sible engagement with government. Business support can make the difference 
between either passing policies that support progress toward a more sustainable 
world or blocking them. Corporate leaders can play an enormously important 
role by demonstrating their own willingness to be transparent about their politi-
cal activities and by speaking out to demand new norms and rules of transpar-
ency for all firms. Failure to do so robs shareholders of their right to know how 
the funds they invest are being used and robs citizens of their right to a govern-
ment not captured by special interests.
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Civil society leaders and researchers also face corresponding new chal-
lenges. Once they have access to reliable and complete information about corpo-
rate political action, they can propose, evaluate, and stimulate the creation of new 
norms and public policies for CPR. A major challenge in this regard will be devel-
oping evaluative frameworks for assessing the extent to which corporate political 
action supports policies that will truly lead to more sustainable outcomes. 
Researchers will continue to play an important role in testing existing sustainabil-
ity metrics and developing new and improved reporting frameworks.
Many citizens of western democracies despair over the inability of their 
governments to solve the pressing problems of our times. They suspect that a 
big part of the problem is the influence of money and corporate power in poli-
tics. Although not a panacea, creating new norms of CPR—coupled with radical 
transparency around corporate political action—is a promising step. Moreover, 
important organizations such as the Global Reporting Initiative, the OECD, and 
Vigeo Eiris are already moving in this direction. The demand for political trans-
parency is unlikely to fade away. The challenge for managers will be whether 
to embrace this movement and take a leadership position in support of greater 
transparency around corporate political action, or to resist it for as long as pos-
sible. Either way, as demands for political transparency grow, it will become 
increasingly difficult for companies to execute a strategy that involves contra-
dictions between virtuous public statements and self-serving lobbying and 
other political activities.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, 
authorship, and/or publication of this article: We gratefully acknowledge funding 
from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Foundation.
Author Biographies
Thomas P. Lyon is the Dow Professor of Sustainable Science, Technology 
and Commerce at the University of Michigan, with appointments in the Ross 
School of Business and the School of Environment and Sustainability (tplyon@
umich.edu). 
The Bretesche Workshop on Systemic Change, held at the Chateau de la 
Bretesche in June 2016, brought together leading scholars affiliated with the 
Alliance for Research on Corporate Sustainability to explore whether, and if 
so how, corporations could help lead systemic change for sustainability. The 
Workshop participants were:
Magali A. Delmas is a Professor of Management at the University of California, 
Los Angeles (UCLA) Institute of the Environment and Sustainability and the 
Anderson School of Management (Delmas@ucla.edu).
John W. Maxwell is the W. George Pinnell Professor of Business Economics and 
Public Policy at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University (jwmax@indi-
ana.edu).
CSR Needs CPR: Corporate Sustainability and Politics 17
Pratima (Tima) Bansal is the Canada Research Chair in Business Sustainability 
at the Ivey Business School at Western University, London, Ontario, Canada 
(tbansal@ivey.ca).
Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline is Professor of Environmental Economics at the Paris 
School of Economics and the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (mireille.
chiroleu-assouline@univ-paris1.fr).
Patricia Crifo is Professor at University Paris Nanterre-Economix and at Ecole 
Polytechnique, and co-responsible of the Chair FDIR for Sustainable Finance and 
Responsible Investment (patricia.crifo@polytechnique.edu).
Rodolphe Durand is the HEC Foundation Senior Chair Professor of Strategy, and 
Society and Organizations Center Director at HEC Paris (durand@hec.fr).
Jean-Pascal Gond is Professor of Corporate Social Responsibility at Cass Business 
School, City University of London and Director of ETHOS—The Centre for 
Responsible Enterprise (jean-pascal.gond.1@city.ac.uk).
Andrew King is Professor of Business Administration at the Tuck School of 
Business in Hanover, New Hampshire (Andrew.A.King@tuck.dartmouth.edu).
Michael Lenox is the Tayloe Murphy Professor of Business and the Senior 
Associate Dean and Chief Strategy Officer at the Darden School of Business, 
University of Virginia (lenoxM@darden.virginia.edu).
Michael Toffel is the Senator John Heinz Professor of Environmental 
Management at the Harvard Business School and Faculty Chair of the HBS 
Business and Environment Initiative (mtoffel@hbs.edu).
David Vogel is the Solomon P. Lee Chair of Business Ethics and Professor 
Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley (jayvogel@
berkeley.edu).
Frank Wijen is an Associate Professor of Strategic Management at Rotterdam 
School of Management, Erasmus University (fwijen@rsm.nl).
Notes
 1. See https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/06/06/1009026/0/en/G-A-s-FLASH- 
REPORT-82-of-the-S-P-500-Companies-Publ ished-Corporate-Sustainabi l i ty-
Reports-in-2016.html.
 2. Ioannis Ioannou and George Serafeim, “What Drives Corporate Social Performance? The 
Role of Nation-Level Institutions,” Journal of International Business Studies, 43/9 (December 
2012): 834-864.
 3. David Vogel, The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).
 4. Piet Eichholtz, Nils Kok, and John M. Quigley, “Doing Well by Doing Good? Green Office 
Buildings,” The American Economic Review, 100/5 (December 2010): 2492-2509.
 5. See https://www.ota.com/news/press-releases/19681.
 6. Jason Potts, Ann Wilkings, Matthew Lynch, and Scott McFatridge, The State of Sustainability 
Initiatives Review: Standards and the Blue Economy (Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada: International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, 2016), p. 332.
 7. Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification, 
Toward Sustainability: The Roles and Limitations of Certification (Washington, DC: RESOLVE, 2012).
 8. Alfred A. Marcus, Innovations in Sustainability (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), p. 2.
CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 00(0)18
 9. See https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/rana-plaza-four-years-later/525252/.
10. Devin-Judge Lord, Constance L. McDermott, and Benjamin Cashore, “How Do Forest 
Certification Policies Change Over Time? Comparing Forest Stewardship Council and the 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative Standards in the United States, 2008-2013” (working paper, 
Yale Program on Forest Policy and Governance, New Haven, CT, 2015).
11. See https://www.commondreams.org/views/2000/09/18/corporations-and-un-nike-and-others-
bluewash-their-images.
12. See https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2011/apr/14/bp-pr-campaign-gulf-oil-spill.
13. See https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jul/07/global-fish-production- 
approaching-sustainable-limit-un-warns.
14. See http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i1688e/i1688e.pdf.
15. See https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21709530-water-becomes-ever-more-scant-
world-needs-conserve-it-use-it-more-efficiently-and.
16. See https://www.nature.com/news/three-years-to-safeguard-our-climate-1.22201.
17. See https://www.greenbiz.com/report/state-green-business-report-2015.
18. There has been much interest in the power of investors to penalize companies for unsus-
tainable actions, but empirical evidence suggests market penalties may simply anticipate 
expected legal penalties. See Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R. Lott, Jr., and Eric W. Wehrl, “The 
Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence,” The Journal of Law 
& Economics, 48/2 (October 2005): 653-675.
19. Vogel, 2007, op. cit., p. 173.
20. Auden Schendler and Michael W. Toffel, “The Factor Environmental Ratings Miss,” MIT 
Sloan Management Review, 53/1 (Fall 2011): 17-18.
21. Shahzad Ansari, Frank Wijen, and Barbara Gray, “Constructing a Climate Change Logic: An 
Institutional Perspective on the ‘Tragedy of the Commons,’” Organization Science, 24/4 (July/
August 2013): 1014-1040.
22. Despite the well-known limitations of both companies’ efforts, the specific actions cited here 
were nonetheless acts of corporate political responsibility at the time they were taken.
23. See https://www.euractiv.com/section/public-affairs/news/green-businesses-rock-employers- 
lobby/.
24. See https://www.corporateleadersgroup.com/about.
25. See https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/15/expect-more-ceos-to-speak-out-on-vital-issues-risk-
ing-the-wrath-of-the-trump-commentary.html.
26. The group’s initial membership included 902 businesses and investors (20 of them part of 
the Fortune 500), 183 colleges and universities, 125 cities and 9 states. Participating firms 
include such familiar names as Apple, Google, Tesla, Target, eBay, Lyft, Adidas, Facebook, 
and Nike, and represent over $6.2 trillion of the U.S. economy. The group’s declaration con-
cludes with these words: “It is imperative that the world know that in the United States, the 
actors that will provide the leadership necessary to meet our Paris commitment are found 
in city halls, state capitals, colleges and universities, investors and businesses. Together, we 
will remain actively engaged with the international community as part of the global effort 
to hold warming to well below 2°C and to accelerate the transition to a clean energy econ-
omy that will benefit our security, prosperity, and health.” https://www.wearestillin.com/
we-are-still-declaration.
27. In addition, the merger of Danone’s North American dairy business with WhiteWave has 
created DanoneWave, the largest benefit corporation in the United States. http://www.csr-
wire.com/press_releases/39933-Danone-CEO-Announces-Intention-to-Deepen-Work-with-
B-Lab.
28. Aaron K. Chatterji and Michael W. Toffel, “The Power of C.E.O. Activism. Grey Matter,” New 
York Times, April 3, 2016, p. SR10.
29. See https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/16/16157398/trump-manufacturing- 
council-disband.
30. See https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/15/expect-more-ceos-to-speak-out-on-vital-issues-risk-
ing-the-wrath-of-the-trump-commentary.html.
31. Sheldon Whitehouse, “The Climate Movement Needs More Corporate Lobbyists,” 
Harvard Business Review Digital Articles, February 25, 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/02/
the-climate-movement-needs-more-corporate-lobbyists.
32. Lee Fang, “CEOs Praised for Backing the Paris Accord Also Funded Lobbyists Pushing 
Trump to Withdraw,” The Intercept, June 4, 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/06/04/
paris-accord-trump-lobby-ceo-withdraw/.
CSR Needs CPR: Corporate Sustainability and Politics 19
33. Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,” New York 
Times Magazine, September 13, 1970, p. 32.
34. Aneel Karnani, “Doing Well by Doing Good: The Grand Illusion,” California Management 
Review, 53/2 (Winter 2011): 69-86.
35. See https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-conquered- 
american-democracy/390822/.
36. George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 2/1 (Spring 1971): 3-21.
37. Robert B. Reich, “The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility,” California 
Management Review, 40/2 (Winter 1998): 8-17.
38. There remain restrictions on the amount of money they can contribute directly to politicians’ 
campaigns, but no limits on the amounts they can spend on “independent” political expendi-
tures or on lobbying.
39. Mary Hunter McDonnell and Timothy Werner, “Into the Dark: Shifts in Corporate Political 
Activity after Social Movement Challenges” (Wharton School working paper, Philadelphia, PA, 
2016).
40. “Kyoto’s ‘Capitalists,’” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB110290434517998109.
41. Timothy Werner, “Investor Reaction to Covert Corporate Political Activity,” Strategic 
Management Journal, 38/12 (December 2017): 2424-2443.
42. See https://www.somo.nl/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/The-Lack-of-Consistency-between-
Corporate-Lobbying-and-CSR-policies.pdf.
43. Thomas P. Lyon and John W. Maxwell, “Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate 
Strategy,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 13/4 (2004): 561-597.
44. “Early drafts of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 included provisions requiring the reg-
istration of firms engaged in astroturf lobbying and the reporting of the expenditures made 
on those actions. Those provisions, however, failed to make it out of committee. As the bill’s 
sponsor, Senator Carl Levin, testified before a House committee considering the bill: ‘Every 
reference to grass roots lobbying—and even to paid efforts to stimulate artificial grass roots 
lobbying—has been deleted from the bill . . . I am personally disappointed that we were 
unable to do anything to address the issue of a form of grassroots lobbying referred to as 
astroturf lobbying, in which lobbyists hire professional experts to run phone banks and gen-
erate mail in support of their efforts. In my view, these paid, professional astroturf cam-
paigns bear nothing in common with the genuine grassroots activities.’” Thomas P. Lyon and 
John W. Maxwell, “Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy,” Journal of 
Economics & Management Strategy, 13/4 (December 2004): 561-597, at p. 580.
45. In Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission the Supreme Court held 5-4 that tax-
exempt 501(c)(4) “social welfare” groups such as the National Rifle Association or the 
Sierra Club were allowed to make political expenditures, as long as the group’s “primary” 
purpose is not electoral advocacy. Moreover, these groups are required to disclose only 
their total political expenditures, but not the identities of their donors. In Speechnow.org 
vs. Federal Election Commission, the DC Circuit of Appeals ruled that nonprofit organiza-
tions created to make “independent” political expenditures (those not formally associated 
with a particular campaign) did not have to be organized as Political Action Committees 
(PACs), and hence could take unlimited amounts of money from corporations as well as 
from individuals.
46. SustainAbility and WWF-UK, Influencing Power: Reviewing the Conduct and Content of Corporate 
Lobbying (London, England: SustainAbility and WWF-UK, 2005).
47. Magali Delmas, Jinghui Lim, and Nicholas Nairn-Birch, “Corporate Environmental 
Performance and Lobbying,” Academy of Management Discoveries, 2/2 (June 2016): 175-197.
48. Thomas P. Lyon and Haitao Yin, “Why Do States Adopt Renewable Portfolio Standards? An 
Empirical Investigation,” The Energy Journal, 31/3 (2010): 133-157.
49. See https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahlandrum/2017/02/22/how-companies-are-saving- 
money-and-making-millennials-happier/#32ad49592591.
50. Innovest and KLD Research were subsequently acquired by RiskMetrics, which in turn was 
acquired by MSCI.
51. See https://b8f65cb373b1b7b15feb-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.
com/comfy/cms/files/files/000/000/991/original/General_Climate_Questionnaire.pdf.
52. “ESG Ratings Methodology: Executive Summary,” MSCI ESG Research, February 2017, 
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/123a2b2b-1395-4aa2-a121-ea14de6d708a.
CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 00(0)20
53. A related offering is the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index, which “comprises companies with high 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) ratings and excludes companies involved in 
Alcohol, Gambling, Tobacco, Military Weapons, Civilian Firearms, Nuclear Power, Adult 
Entertainment, and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO). The Index aims to serve as a 
benchmark for investors whose objectives include owning companies with very high ESG 
ratings and excluding companies involved in the production of products and services with 
high negative social and/or environmental impact.”
54. Remco Van den Heuvel, “How Robust Are CSR Benchmarks? Comparing ASSET4 with 
Sustainalytics” (Master’s thesis, Tilburg University, 2012).
55. Ibid.
56. See https://www.globalreporting.org/Information/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx.
57. “GRI 415: Public Policy,” Global Sustainability Standards Board. https://www.globalreport-
ing.org/standards/media/1030/gri-415-public-policy-2016.pdf.
58. GRI 415 also provides more detailed guidance on political contributions than Asset4 or 
Sustainalytics. “The reporting organization shall report the following information: a. Total 
monetary value of financial and in-kind political contributions made directly and indirectly 
by the organization by country and recipient/beneficiary. b. If applicable, how the monetary 
value of in-kind contributions was estimated.”
59. See https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/Lobbying-Brochure.pdf.
60. See http://files.politicalaccountability.net/index/2016CPAZicklinIndex.pdf.
61. See http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/fostering_transparency_in_lobbying_
activities_in_france.
62. Steven R. Barley, “Building an Institutional Field to Corral A Government: A Case to Set an 
Agenda for Organization Studies,” Organization Studies, 31/6 (June 2010): 777-805.
63. See https://www.unpri.org/download_report/8535.
64. The two firms merged in 2015. http://www.vigeo-eiris.com/vigeo-and-eiris-completed- 
their-merger-2/.
65. See the press release from Vigeo, “Vigeo to Rate Corporate Lobbying Practices,” July 1, 2010, 
https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20100618_france_vigeo_to_rate_corpo-
rate_lobbying_practices.
66. See http://www.vigeo-eiris.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/20130613_PR_Lobbying_
Study_EN_pdf.pdf?x60030.
67. See https://www.csrhub.com/files/Vigeo%20Thematic%20Report%20sample.pdf.
68. See http://united4thepeople.org/state-and-local-support-2/#AddRes.
69. See https://www.mprnews.org/story/2010/07/27/target-campaign-donations.
70. Thomas C. Lawton, Jonathan P. Doh, and Tazeeb Rajwani, Aligning for Advantage: Competitive 
Strategies for the Political and Social Arenas (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014).
71. Joshua Daniel Margolis and James P. Walsh, People and Profits? The Search for a Link between a 
Company’s Social and Financial Performance (New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2001). Herman 
Aguinis and Ante Glavas, “What We Know and Don’t Know about Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Review and Research Agenda,” Journal of Management, 38/4 (July 2012): 
932-968.
72. Stuart L. Hart and Gautam Ahuja, “Does It Pay to be Green? An Empirical Examination of 
the Relationship between Emission Reduction and Firm Performance,” Business Strategy and 
the Environment, 5/1 (March 1996): 30-37; Andrew King and Michael Lenox, “Exploring the 
Locus of Profitable Pollution Reduction,” Management Science, 48/2 (February 2002): 289-299.
73. Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. De Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr., “Why Is There so 
Little Money in U.S. Politics?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17/1 (Winter 2003): 105-130.
74. Michael Hadani and Douglas A. Schuler, “In search of El Dorado: The Elusive Financial 
Returns on Corporate Political Investments,” Strategic Management Journal, 34/2 (February 
2013): 165-181.
75. Karnani, 2011, op. cit.
